Is pseudonymised data personal data under GDPR in Ireland?
· Updated

Joaquín Trapero in AI and privacy expert, and founder of Nonimo.
Is pseudonymised data personal data? For the firm that swapped the names out and kept the original, yes. For whoever receives the coded version, the Court of Justice gave a narrower answer in September 2025. How the term sits beside de-identified and anonymised is in our guide to those three words.
The question has stopped being academic. Somebody in an Irish office takes a paragraph from a file, replaces the client’s name and PPS number, and pastes the rest into a chatbot. Whether that number was the only thing to worry about is answered in is a PPSN personal data.
Yes, for you: if you can reverse it, pseudonymised data stays personal data under the GDPR. For a recipient that cannot undo the coding or work out who it is from what is left, EDPS v SRB says it may not be. An AI provider acting for you takes your answer.
Who holds the lookup table decides whether it is personal data
Personal data for whom?
Answer for the text in front of you.
Whose position are you checking?
Does the recipient process the text on your instructions, under a contract (typically a business or API plan)?
Does the lookup table, or the original file, ever travel with the text?
Could someone with the recipient's other data still pick out the person from the role, place, dates and sums left in?
Our reading of EDPS v SRB, C-413/23 P, paragraphs 76, 77, 85, 111 and 112, and of EDPB Guidelines 02/2026, still a draft. A way of thinking a case through, not a legal opinion on any particular file.
Recital 26 says coded data that could be attributed with additional information “should be considered” personal. The Court of Justice read it as relative: not personal “in all cases and for every person” (EDPS v SRB, paragraph 86). The provider’s desk worries me most; which AI tools meet the GDPR in Ireland compares the plans.
Article 4(5) GDPR and the Data Protection Act 2018 definition
Article 4(5) has three parts: data processed so it can no longer be tied to a specific person without additional information; that information kept separately; and protected by technical and organisational measures. Section 69 of the Data Protection Act 2018 repeats the definition for Part 5, the law enforcement rules.
Drop one part and you hold a copy with some words changed. A code list sitting on a hidden tab of the same workbook fails “kept separately” before anyone tries to read it. I don’t let the word into a privacy notice for a file kept like that.
Where pseudonymisation appears in the law that applies in Ireland
| Provision | What it does there |
|---|---|
| GDPR, Article 4(5) | Defines the term |
| Recital 26 | Coded data that can be linked back is about an identifiable person |
| Article 89(1) | A safeguard for research and statistics, where the purpose allows |
| DPA 2018, s. 36(1)(e)(iv) | One of the suitable and specific measures |
| DPA 2018, s. 42(1) and (3) | Research and statistics depend on those measures; if the purpose can be met without identifying people, it must be |
| DPA 2018, s. 69 | The definition for Part 5, law enforcement |
| S.I. No. 314 of 2018, reg. 3(1)(b)(vi) | Research plans must name anyone the data goes to, "including where it has been pseudonymised or anonymised" |
GDPR on EUR-Lex; Data Protection Act 2018, these sections unamended in the Law Reform Commission's revised Act; Health Research Regulations 2018. Software draws the same line between reversible and not: of the Presidio Anonymizer's operators, only encryption can be undone out of the box.
In Irish law the word works mostly as a safeguard: section 36(1)(e)(iv) lists it among the suitable and specific measures, as with special category data in an Irish workplace.
Anonymised or only coded? The DPC’s difference, with an example
The DPC’s guidance note is dated June 2019, and on 7 November 2026 the linked copy still carried that date, with no word on SRB. Pseudonymisation, in its terms, swaps identifying details for a value that does not identify anyone directly, and it warns the protection is limited because indirect routes still work.
Anonymisation has to stop three things: singling one person out, linking records and inferring facts about someone. Done irreversibly, the data is no longer personal and the GDPR stops applying. The same invented claims record, treated both ways with the note’s own techniques, shows the gap better than a definition does.
One claims record, coded and then anonymised
| Field | As held | Pseudonymised | Anonymised |
|---|---|---|---|
| Name | Pádraic Lonergan | CL-0418 | Removed |
| PPS number | 7351902NA | CL-0418 again | Removed |
| Town | Ennistymon | Ennistymon | Co. Clare |
| Age | 47 | 47 | 45 to 54 |
| Claim | €2,340 on 12 May 2026 | €2,340 on 12 May 2026 | €2,000 to €2,499, May 2026 |
| The way back | Not needed | A lookup table kept apart | None: original deleted, each combination shared by at least five people |
Fictional person, PPS number and claim. Techniques from the DPC's 2019 note: masking, generalisation and k-anonymisation. Tokenisation lands in the middle column whenever a vault can turn the token back into the value.
The middle column is still about Pádraic for anyone holding the lookup table, and possibly for anyone who knows Ennistymon. I trust the right-hand column only once the original is gone, because the DPC says a version kept beside its source may be just pseudonymised.
| What the DPC note says | What it means for a document |
|---|---|
| If the source data is not deleted, the "anonymised" version may be only pseudonymised, and still personal data | The Word original in the matter file keeps every cleaned copy personal data. An author field or saved path in a file's metadata can carry part of the link too |
| Pseudonymised data can be matched directly against other available data | Calling one client "Client A" in every prompt for a month builds a single thread at the provider |
| Personal knowledge can identify where outsiders can't: a doctor reading a study, residents of a village reading crime figures | In a small town the reader may know who it is without any lookup table at all |
That matching risk is sharper with chatbots than with spreadsheets, because chats are kept. Google holds Gemini conversations picked for human review for up to three years, and a consistent label makes them easy to string together.
EDPS v SRB, C-413/23 P: when coded data stops being personal for the recipient
After Banco Popular Español was resolved, the Single Resolution Board coded comments from shareholders and creditors and sent them to Deloitte. The European Data Protection Supervisor found that people should have been told Deloitte would receive them.
The Court of Justice ruled on 4 September 2025, and the case went no further. It was under Regulation 2018/1725, which binds EU bodies, but paragraph 52 says personal data is read the same way there and in the GDPR. I wouldn’t sign off an Irish privacy notice now without this judgment open beside it.
| Paragraph | What the Court said | What it changes for an Irish office |
|---|---|---|
| 58 to 60 | Opinions relate to the person who holds them, with no need to weigh content, purpose or effect | Views in work emails can reach subject access requests, as William Fry lawyers noted in the Law Society Gazette |
| 76 | The controller that pseudonymised usually has what lets it attribute the data | Personal data for your firm |
| 77 | For a recipient it may not be personal, if it cannot lift the measures and the measures stop it identifying anyone by cross-checking | Two conditions, both needed |
| 85 | If it cannot be ruled out that a recipient can attribute it, the person is identifiable for that transfer and later processing | The doubt works against you |
| 111 and 112 | The duty to inform is judged at collection, from the controller's side | The recipient's view doesn't excuse your notice |
Paragraph 81, which summaries skip, recalls that a press release naming nobody can still identify someone once combined with what is online. A provider’s logs sit beside a vast amount of other text, and what ChatGPT keeps on each plan decides how long yours stays to be matched.
Coded prompts in ChatGPT, Claude and Copilot: personal data for the provider?
If the substitution happens on your computer and the table linking each label to its value stays there, the provider has nothing to reverse, and the first condition of paragraph 77 can be met. That part is architecture, and software can settle it.
The second condition depends on who the provider is to you. On a consumer account it judges from its own position, and I wouldn’t bet a client’s file on it passing.
Which account is the text going to?
Your processor, under a contract.
Yes, on the EDPB's draft reading, because it takes your view.
Swapping identifiers still leaves less to read, store or lose. Terms differ by product: see Anthropic's rules for Claude.
Deciding at least some purposes itself, so not purely your processor.
Yes, unless both conditions of paragraph 77 hold.
Check whether chats train models and how long they are kept, as set out for Microsoft's four Copilots.
Usually your processor under API terms.
As for a business plan, but you choose where the swap runs.
The substitution can run on your own server before each request, which is what Nonimo Gateway is for.
LLM Guard, now archived, kept real values in a vault and restored them.
Portkey's redaction can't be reversed.
Our reading of EDPB Guidelines 02/2026 (draft), paragraph 15 and Example 4, and EDPS v SRB, paragraph 77. The contract you signed is what counts.
EDPB guidelines on anonymisation: where the drafts stand on 7 November 2026
Two EDPB texts sit around the judgment, and neither is final. The pseudonymisation draft predates SRB: its paragraph 22 treats coded data as personal whenever the pieces could be combined by means reasonably likely to be used, even with different people holding each.
The 2026 anonymisation draft cites SRB and judges from each entity’s own perspective. The Commission’s Digital Omnibus would write that relative reading into the GDPR, but it is still in committee in Parliament.
What is settled and what is still a draft
The AI Act runs on its own calendar, covered in what the AI Act asks of Irish businesses.
| Text | Date | Status on 7 November 2026 |
|---|---|---|
| EDPB Guidelines 01/2025 on pseudonymisation | Adopted 16 January 2025 | Consultation closed 14 March 2025; still version 1, no final text |
| Digital Omnibus, COM(2025) 837 | Proposed 19 November 2025 | In Parliament, awaiting committee decision; draft report 22 June 2026 |
| SRB v EDPS, T-557/20 RENV | 19 December 2025 | Removed from the register; no further ruling |
| EDPB Guidelines 02/2026 on anonymisation | Adopted 7 July 2026 | Consultation 8 July to 30 October 2026; version 1.0, no final text |
EDPB document and consultation pages; Court of Justice and General Court registers; European Parliament Legislative Observatory, procedure 2025/0360(COD). All read on 7 November 2026.
Until final texts land, I’d write office rules to the stricter 2025 draft and put them in the firm’s AI policy, where people will actually look.
How the CSO and Irish health researchers handle coded data
The CSO’s Health Research Data Centre removes names, addresses and dates of birth and links records by a Protected Identifier Key kept inside the CSO. It still calls the result “safe, pseudonymised, personal data”.
The Health Research Consent Declaration Committee agrees in its FAQs: coded data is personal data and the Health Research Regulations apply. Chart reviews in a practice are covered in our guide to patient data and AI.
| CSO Health Research Data Centre | A coded paste into a chatbot | |
|---|---|---|
| Where the link back sits | Inside the CSO | With you, if the swap ran on your machine |
| Where the coded data sits | On a CSO server; researchers work on it there | On the provider's servers, for as long as its terms allow |
| Checks on what comes out | Every output checked by a data custodian | None, unless you add one |
For me this is the Irish yardstick: the State codes data and still treats it as personal, behind several locks. A paste with the names swapped has one lock, at best.
Identifiable without a name: testing a client paragraph
Here is an invented note a small practice might ask a chatbot to turn into a letter, with a typical swap, not any particular tool’s output.
The same note, before and after a name-and-number swap
Client Ailbhe Gilsenan, PPSN on file, assistant manager at the credit union in Drumcullig, Co. Leitrim, since 2011. Let go on 3 March 2026 after querying a loan approval. WRC hearing on 19 January 2027. Her brother sits on the county council. Wants a firm letter that leaves the door open.
Client [CLIENT], PPSN [PPSN], assistant manager at the credit union in Drumcullig, Co. Leitrim, since 2011. Let go on 3 March 2026 after querying a loan approval. WRC hearing on 19 January 2027. Her brother sits on the county council. Wants a firm letter that leaves the door open.
Fictional client, village and dates. Highlighted: what still points to one person.
One credit union in a small Leitrim village has one assistant manager. WRC hearings have been held in public since 29 July 2021, and decisions name the parties unless the adjudication officer finds special circumstances. A published decision with the same dates is exactly the other data paragraph 85 means.
The Court asks whether you can rule identification out, not whether the provider will go looking. So a list of what to redact can’t stop at names and numbers.
What is still in your paragraph after the swap?
Include anything hiding in speaker notes or comments behind a slide.
0 of 8 points
Nothing on the list. The second condition of paragraph 77 may hold for a recipient, though the text is still personal data for you.
For someone local this may already be one person. Generalise what you ticked before it goes.
Treat it as identifiable for the provider. Rewrite the facts, not only the names.
Built on the DPC's 2019 note (data linking, personal knowledge) and EDPS v SRB, paragraphs 77, 81 and 85. Two items count double. A scanned driving licence in the same file (how to redact an Irish driving licence) identifies directly and needs redacting separately. Nothing you tick leaves this page.
The version I’d send: an assistant manager at a small financial institution, long service, dismissed this year after raising a concern, hearing pending. Accountants meet the same problem in a client’s payroll query.
Estate agencies meet it in a sale-agreed note with the townland and price left in, the case AI for Irish estate agents is built around.
Article 28, legal privilege and breach rules still apply to coded text
The EDPB’s 2025 draft credits coding with the help listed below; other duties ignore it. The notice that goes with your engagement letter still has to name the provider as a recipient, whatever was swapped.
| What coding helps with | What it leaves untouched |
|---|---|
| A legitimate interests assessment, Article 6(1)(f) | The Article 28 contract with the provider |
| Showing a new purpose is compatible, Article 6(4)(e) | Telling clients who receives their data (SRB, paragraphs 111 and 112) |
| Design and security duties, Articles 25 and 32 | Legal privilege (Practice Direction HC 142, paragraph 10(5)) |
| A legal basis for the coding step itself (EDPB draft, paragraph 23) | Breach duties if someone reverses it without authority (Recitals 75 and 85) |
Practice Direction HC 142, in operation in the High Court since 1 September 2026, says: “Privileged information entered into non-private GenAI Tools or systems may lose its privileged status.” What a deponent declares under HC 142 is a separate duty.
That turns on where the text went, not on names, so I count coding as a weak plank in any privilege argument. Our page for solicitors sets out the Law Society’s side.
If someone reverses a coded file without authority, check whether it is a notifiable breach before the 72 hours run.
![A mobile number coded as a label A mobile number coded as [PHONE_1]: pseudonymised data stays personal data for the Irish firm that keeps the lookup table](/guias/en-ie/is-pseudonymised-data-personal-data-phone-label.webp)
Before a coded passage leaves the office
SRB swaps “did I take the names out” for a sharper question: who could tell who this is, and holding what? Nonimo answers the part software can. It is an app for Mac and Windows: select a passage, press one key, and names and numbers become labels on your own computer.
That happens before the text reaches ChatGPT, Claude or Copilot, and your originals go back into the reply you copy. The label list never leaves your machine, as our security page explains, so in law the text stays personal data for you.
What the app settles
- Names and numbers become labels on your computer
- The list linking labels to values stays with you
What stays your call
- Whether a role, a place and a date add up to one person
- Which plan you use, and the contract behind it
What it cannot judge is the credit union in Drumcullig. My rule of thumb: if someone local would know who it is, assume the provider could too, and rewrite. Nonimo for Irish firms shows the app on an Irish document, if you want to try that on your next letter.
Sources
- Court of Justice, EDPS v SRB, C-413/23 P, 4 September 2025. Paragraphs 52 to 112.
- European Data Protection Board, Guidelines 02/2026 on Anonymisation, version 1.0, adopted 7 July 2026. Paragraph 15 and Example 4. Guidelines 01/2025 on Pseudonymisation, version 1, paragraphs 22 and 23 and footnote 21, are on the same site.
- Data Protection Commission, Guidance Note on Anonymisation and Pseudonymisation, June 2019.
- Data Protection Act 2018, section 36. Suitable and specific measures; sections 42 and 69 on the same site.
- Law Society Gazette, CJEU ruling knock-on for subject-access requests, 14 October 2025. The access-request point on opinions.
- Health Research Regulations 2018, S.I. No. 314 of 2018. Regulation 3(1)(b)(vi).
- Central Statistics Office, Health Research Data Centre FAQ. Protected Identifier Key, output checks, approvals.
- Health Research Consent Declaration Committee, frequently asked questions. FAQs 1 and 6: coded data is personal data.
- High Court, Practice Direction HC 142, 29 July 2026. Paragraph 10(5) on privilege.
- Workplace Relations Commission, Workplace Relations (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2021 guidance. Public hearings from 29 July 2021.
- GDPR, Article 4(5) and Recitals 26, 75 and 85; General Court order of 19 December 2025, T-557/20 RENV; Digital Omnibus, COM(2025) 837, procedure 2025/0360(COD).
Checked on 7 November 2026.
Common questions
Is pseudonymised data classed as personal data?
Yes, for whoever can reverse it, nearly always the firm that coded it. Since EDPS v SRB, a recipient with no way back and nothing to cross-check may hold it as non-personal data.
What is pseudonymised data?
Data whose identifiers are replaced so it needs extra information to point back to someone. Article 4(5) GDPR adds that the extra information is kept separately and protected.
Does pseudonymised data include names and addresses?
No, those are swapped for codes or labels and the link is stored separately. Everything else in the record stays, which is why a role, a place and a date can still point to one person.
What is the difference between anonymised and pseudonymised data?
Anonymised data can no longer identify anyone, so the GDPR stops applying. Pseudonymised data, say a name swapped for CL-0418 with the table kept elsewhere, can be linked back and remains personal data.
Is tokenised data the same as pseudonymised data?
Usually, yes. If a vault can turn each token back into the original value, the tokens are pseudonymised data and stay personal data for whoever can reach that vault.
Does the EDPS v SRB ruling affect subject access requests?
It may widen them. The Court held that a person's opinions relate to that person by nature, so views written in work emails can fall within an access request.
What counts as personal data under the GDPR?
Any information about an identified or identifiable living person. That covers indirect clues too: a job title, a townland and a date together can be enough, as the Court found with a press release naming nobody.
What personal data is not covered by GDPR?
Data about a purely personal or household activity falls outside it. So does anonymised data, and information about companies or people who have died, which strictly is not personal data at all.